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Recent Decisions
AGENCY - ExPREss AUTHORITY OR ESTOPPEL
Plaintiff sued to recover a broker's commission under a con-
tract with defendant. Defendant asserted its agent had no authority
to make the agreement. The trial court ruled, as a matter of law,
that the agent had authority and plaintiff was awarded the verdict.
The Court of Appeals reversed. On appeal, held, affirmed. The
agent, as a matter of law, did not have the authority to bind the
defendant. Miller v. The Wick Building Co., 154 Ohio St. 93, 93
N.E. 2d 467 (1950).
The Supreme Court stated that if the defendant by its words
or conduct, reasonably interpreted, caused the agent to believe
that he had authority to make the agreement, the defendant would
be bound. The court said it was necessary to hold the defendant
in order to protect the agent, who had acted reasonably, from li-
ability for breach of implied warranty. It labeled this power of
the agent to bind the defendant "implied authority," and in a foot-
note distinguished it from authority incidental to authority ex-
pressly conferred.
Most authorities divide the authority of an agent into express,
implied and apparent authority and ratification. RESTATEmENT,
AGENCY §§ 7, 8 (1933). These authorities describe a similar fact
situation to the one at bar as express authority. They indicate that
the manifestations of the principal confer express authority al-
though the principal does not, in fact, (subjectively) intend to be
bound. Bradstreet Co. v. Gill, 72 Tex. 115, 9 S. W. 753 (1888); RE-
STATEMENT, AGENCY § 26 (1933); MECHEm, AGENCY § 247 (2d ed.
1914). This is the same as the objective test used in the law of
contracts. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 26 (1933); RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS § 20 (1932). In the principal case the court called this power
of the agent to bind defendant on the basis of defendant's own
manifestations "implied authority", a term more properly attached
to authority inferred from express authority. Groves v. Horton, 38
Minn. 66, 35 N.W. 568 (1887); M _cHEm, AGENCY § 708 (2d ed. 1914).
Furthermore, the court talked as if the authority did not, in fact,
exist but was "implied" to protect the innocent agent from liability,
seeming to place its decision on the basis of estoppel rather than on
the basis of express authority. The use of this estoppel notion in
place of express authority is not supported by the authorities. In
fact, one of the few authorities to recognize a similarity between
the objective approach and estoppel hastens to point out the mark-
ed difference. WILLiSTON, CONTRACTS § 98 (rev. ed. 1936).
Ohio has consistently held, in line with other states, that the
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objective intention of the parties controls in a contractual agree-
ment. Bach v. Friden Calculating Machine Co., 155 F. 2d 361 (6th.
Cir. 1946); National City Bank of Cleveland v. Citizens Bldg. Co.
of Cleveland, 74 N. E. 2d 273 (Ohio 1947). A Federal court sitting
in Ohio has applied this same test to the scope of an agent's ex-
press authority, the very problem that exists in the principal case.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Ringstaff, 67 F. 2d 482 (6th. Cir. 1933).
The court's failure to use the term express authority is therefore
inconsistent with previous Ohio cases. But could the court be cor-
rect in talking in terms of estoppel? Ohio courts have always re-
quired some element of irresponsibility or intention to mislead on
the part of the person being estopped. Board of Education v. Sinton,
41 Ohio St. 504 (1885). This element was not present in the princi-
pal case. Therefore, an essential element of estoppel was also mis-
sing.
It is clear that the court has confused termionology by calling
express authority "implied authority"; it is also clear that the use
of language peculiar to estoppel was improper. The term express
authority would have been more accurate and would have ade-
quately protected the agent from unjust liability without adding
confusion in this difficult area.
William H. Lutz, Jr.
CONSTITUTiONAL LAW - SIxTH AMENDMENT - IMPARTIAL JURY -
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ON JURY WHEN GOVERNMENT Is A PARTY
Petitioner, a leader of the Communist party, was charged with
contempt of Congress for failing to respond to a subpoena issued
by the House Committee on Un-American activities. 52 STAT. 942,
2 USCA § 192 (1938). At the trial defendant, on voir dire, chal-
lenged for cause all prospective jurors who were government em-
ployees. Petitioner based his challenge on the fact that govern-
ment employees are subject to discharge, under the presidential
loyalty order, if reasonable grounds exist for the belief that they
are disloyal. Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 FED. REG. 1935 (1947). Pe-
titioner reasoned that a vote for acquittal of a member of the Com-
munist party could expose a juror to possible discharge. There-
fore petitioner urged that government employees be disqualified
for implied bias as a matter of law. The challenge was denied and
petitioner exercised his peremptory challenges, two of which were
used against government employees. As finally constituted, the
jury contained seven government employees. Petitioner was con-
victed and the case was affirmed on appeal. 171 F. 2d 986 (D. C.
Cir. 1948). The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the
question whether government employees may properly serve on a
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jury in a criminal trial where the government is an interested party.
Held, affirmed. In the absence of a showing of "special circum-
stances" mere employment by the government is insufficient to
support a challenge for implied bias. Dennis v. United States, 339
U.S. 162 (1950).
During the period before 1935 government employees in the
District of Columbia were not allowed to serve as jurors in actions
involving the government. This was due to the ruling in the case of
Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183 (1908), holding applicable
to government as well as to private parties the common law rule
disqualifying a servant as a juror where the master is party to
the suit. The decision was based on a statement in Blackstone, 3
BL. Commnv. 363, which has been incorporated into American practice.
Citizens Light and Electric Co. v. Lee, 182 Ala. 561, 62 So. 199
(1913); Vallejo R. Co. v. Reed Orchard Co., 169 Cal. 545, 147 Pac.
238 (1915); BUSCH, LAw AN TAcTIcs 3N Jrmy TRiALs 161 (1949).
The effect of the Crawford case, because of the unusual num-
ber of government employees in Washington, was to create a scarci-
ty of jurors. Because of this situation Congress passed an act in
1935 qualifying for jury service all persons "otherwise qualified ac-
cording to law whether employed in the service of the government
or of the District of Columbia." 49 STAT. 682 (1935); D. C. CODE
1940 § 11-1420. The constitutionality of the statute was attacked in
United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936). The case involved a
charge of petty larceny from a department store, with three govern-
ment employees serving on the jury. It was argued that the "im-
partial jury" provided for in the Sixth Amendment must be given
its common law meaning, thus disqualifying servants of the gov-
ernment. The court held the statute constitutional, stating that:
(1) the rule as to servants on the jury where the master is an in-
terested party did not apply to the government at common law and
(2) even if it did the Congress had power to abrogate the rule
without violating the Sixth Amendment. It was stated, however,
that a holding of disqualification for implied bias would be upheld
in a "special or exceptional" case. The court acknowledged that a
showing of actual bias could always be made.
The decision in the Wood case was followed uniformly in the
lower federal courts with no consideration of any "special circum-
stances" which might be classified as exceptional. Great Atlantic
and Pacific Tea Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 91 F. 2d 625 (D.C. Cir.
1937) (violation of weights and measures act); Smith v. United
States, 91 F. 2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (violation of liquor tax law).
This was true even in cases where the government had an interest
far more direct than that of the Wood case. Baker v. Hudspeth, 129
F. 2d 799 (10th Cir. 1942) (violation of postal laws). Higgins v.
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United States, 160 F. 2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (violation of narcotics
law). Indeed, the rule was followed in a case where the offense,
espionage involving a German agent, was directly against the gov-
ernment, Shackow v. Government of the Canal Zone, 108 F. 2d 625
(5th Cir. 1939).
The failure of the lower federal courts to carve out an excep-
tion to the rule of the Wood case was reflected in Frazier v. United
States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948), where a majority of the court held that
no special circumstances were created sufficient to sustain a chal-
lenge for cause in a trial where the jury was composed entirely of
government employees, some of whom were employees of the de-
partment prosecuting a violation of the narcotics law. The ruling,
however, is somewhat weakened by the fact "that petitioner him-
self was responsible for the jury's final composition!' There was
a vigorous dissent by Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Frank-
furter, Douglas and Murphy, on the ground that pressure on gov-
ernment employees has increased and is demanding "not only
probity, but unquestioning ideological loyalty."
After the Frazier case was decided a definite change in the at-
titude of the lower federal courts can be found. The question of im-
plied bias arose in two cases involving "politically infamous" de-
fendants whose offenses were in the nature of direct affronts to
the government. May v. United States, 175 F. 2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1949); Eisler v. United States, 176 F. 2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1949). The
rule of the Wood case was followed in both instances but there is
indication of a desire for more latitude on the questions of employ-
ment in the department prosecuting the charge and the notoriety
of the defendant as creating the "special circumstances" needed for
a holding of implied bias. See especially Justice Edgerton's dis-
sent in the Eisler case, where the prosecutor had made the state-
ment that the defendant was "anti-government."
Since the principal case also denies an exception to the rule of
the Wood case where the defendant's crime and political status are
such that the government has a direct stake in prosecution, it may
be seriously questioned whether such an exception exists at all.
Nevertheless, the issue is not entirely closed. That an exception
should be made where the government has a "direct" interest in
the suit is urged in the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson and
the dissents of Justices Black and Frankfurter. Justice Douglas,
in Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258 (1950), has indicated
sympathy with the dissenter's viewpoint. This leaves a four to four
alignment on the question, with the balance of power in Justice
Clark, who disqualified himself in the principal case. In these
circumstances the long run effect of the loyalty order may yet pro-
duce an exception to the Wood rule. Justice Minton based his
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opinion in a large part on the fact that since, at the trial of this
defendant, the loyalty order had been only recently promulgated,
its effects on government employees would be very negligible. In
1951 this position hardly remains tenable. Perhaps an anticipatory
realization of this fact underlies the earlier actions of the govern-
ment in twice consenting to the exclusion of its employees from
the jury panel in cases of "direct" government interest. Barsky v.
United States, 72 F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1947); Christoffel v. United
States 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
Harold Ticktin
DomasTic RELATIONS - Loss OF CONSORTIUM - AcToN BY WIFE
" Plaintiff sued to recover damages for loss of consortium due
to defendant's negligent injury of her husband. Defendant's mo-
tion for a summary judgment on the grounds that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action was granted. On appeal, held, re-
versed. A wife has a cause of action for loss of consortium due to
a negligent injury of her husband, and consortium includes not
only material services, but also love, affection, companionship,
and marital relations. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co. Inc., 183 F. 2d 811
(D. C. Cir. 1950).
While the term "consortium" has been variously defined, the
definition given in Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P. 2d 147 (1940),
may be regarded as typical. It is there defined as "the conjugal
fellowship of husband and wife, and the right of each to the com-
pany, cooperation, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation."
The majority of courts under common law, found no difficulty
in sustaining the husband's right to recover in circumstances identi-
cal with the principal case. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Jones, 21 Colo.
340, 40 Pac. 891 (1895); McKinney v. Western Stagg Co., 4 Iowa
420 (1857); See Notes, 21 A. L. R. 1517 (1922); 133 A. L. R. 1156
(1941). Nor did the courts, with the exception of a few, hold other-
wise after the passage of the Women's Enabling Acts which gave to
the wife the right to sue and be sued as a feme sole. Louisville &
N. R. Co. v. Kinman, 182 Ky. 597, 206 S.W. 880 (1918); Baltimore
& 0. R. Co. v. Glenn, 66 Ohio St. 395, 64 N.E. 438 (1902); Newhirter
v. Hatten, 42 Iowa 288 (1875); See Notes, 21 A.L.R. 1517 (1921);
133 A. L. R. 1156 (1941). In similar fashion, the right of a wife to
sue for loss of consortium resulting from a direct attack upon the
marital relation, by alienation of affections or criminal conver-
sation, has been recognized. Many of the courts permitted such an
action on the theory that the wife's right to the consortium of her
husband had always existed, although previously she had no remedy
because of the common law disabilities of a married woman. Haynes
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v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581, 29 N.E. 389 (1891); Bennett v. Bennett.
116 N.Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17 (1889); Coo=Ey, TORTS § 170 (4th ed.
1932). On the other hand, there has been no development of a
remedy for the wife where the interference with the marital re-
lation is indirect, though negligent, or even intentional. In such
cases, the courts have consistently refused to grant her recovery.
Tyler v. Brown Service Funeral Homes Co., 250 Ala. 295, 34 So. 2d
(1948); Giggey v. Gallagher Transp. Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P. 2d 1100
(1937); Boden v. Del Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933);
Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1919); Nieberg v.
Cohen, 88 Vt. 281, 92 Atl. 214 (1914); See Notes, 5 A. L. R. 1049
(1920); 13 A. L. R. 1333 (1921); 18 A. L. R. 882 (1922); 37 A. L. R.
897 (1925); 59 A. L. R. 680 (1929).
In the decision of the principal case, the court recognized that
it stands alone in granting a wife recovery for loss of consortium
occasioned by a negligent injury to her husband. Prior to the prin-
cipal case, there seems to have been only one case in which recovery
was granted. Hipp v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. 182 N.C. 9,
108 S. E. 318; 18 A. L. R. 873 (1921). This case was immediately
repudiated by Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126
S.E. 307 (1925).
An analysis of the cases reveals that there are various reasons
used to deny the wife recovery where the injury to the marital re-
lation is indirect. Some courts deny recovery on the theory that
although consortium includes elements of companionship, love and
fellowship, nevertheless the material services are the dominating,
if not the predominant factor for which compensation is granted,
and the sentimental elements are only considered in aggravation
of damages. Starting with this premise, these courts conclude that
since a wife has no right, as such, to her husband's services, she
has no cause of action; although her husband, having always been
entitled to his wife's services, still has his right of action. Boden
v. Del Mar Garage, supra; Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E.
631 (1912); Stout v. Kansas City Term. Ry. Co., 172 Mo. App. 113,
157 S.W. 1019 (1913).
Other courts, relying upon the same basic premise, conclude
that since the Women's Enabling Acts have given the wife the right
to the fruits of her own labors, such Acts have therefore placed the
husband in a position similar to that mentioned above for the wife,
and therefore deny both - husband as well as wife - a right of
action. Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E. 2d
611 (1945); Clark v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, 144 Kan. 344,
58 P 2d 1128 (1936); Harker v. Bushouse, 254 Mich. 187, 236 N.W.
222 (1931); Marri v. Stamford St. Ry. Co., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582
(1911); Bolger v. Boston Elevated R.R. Co., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E.
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389 (1910); See Notes, 21 A. L. R. 1517, 1527 (1922); 133 A. L. R.
1156, 1162 (1941).
The basic premise of these courts - that the material services
are the predominant element in consortium -is however contrary
to the weight of authority. Guevin v. Manchester, 78 N.H. 289, 99
Atl. 298 (1916); Lanve v. Dunning, 186 Ky. 797, 218 S.W. 269 (1920);
Birmingham Southern R. Co. v. Linter, 141 Ala. 4420, 38 So. 363
(1904); See 27 Avr. Jim. 505. The case of Lane v. Dunning, supra,
held that the husband's right of action for damages for loss of con-
sortium does not rest upon the ground of services alone, but upon
the loss of society or consortium arising by virtue of the marriage
contract. In addition, it is interesting to note that the cases permit-
ting recovery by either spouse for alienation of affections present
a formidable array of authority contrary to the basic premise adopt-
ed by these courts. Typical of these is the case of Burke v. Johnson,
274 Ky. 405, 118 S. W. 2d 731 (1938) which concluded that the gist
of the action for alienation of affections is not the loss of services,
but loss of consortium or conjugal rights, which include companion-
ship, fellowship, affection, and society of the alienated spouse.
Lockwood v. Lockwood, 67 Minn. 476, 70 N.W. 784 (1897). See
also CooLEY, TORTS § 170 (4th ed. 1932).
Another group of cases deny the wife recovery on the theory
that it would result in double recovery. They arrive at such a con-
clusion by reasoning that where a husband is physically injured,
the damages he recovers not only makes him whole again, but also
enables him to discharge all his marital duties to his family to the
same degree as before the injury. Bernhardt v. Perry, supra; Giggey
v. Gallagher Transp. Co., supra; Eschenback v. Benjamine, 195
Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935).
These courts likewise are placing questionable emphasis on the
element of services as the predominating factor in consortium. As
the court in the principal case recognized, however, if the wife is
permitted to recover there could be a double recovery in regard to
the service element of consortium, and therefore the amount al-
locable to this particular element should be deducted from her to-
tal recovery.
Still another group of cases deny the wife recovery on the
theory that her loss of consortium, resulting from a negligent act
of the defendant, is too remote and indirect to permit recovery, and
hence, distinguish it from direct injuries to the marital relation oc-
casioned by alienation of affection. Smith v. Nickolas Bldg. Co., 93
Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915); Gambino v. Mfgrs. Coal & Coke
Co., 175 Mo. App. 653, 158 S.W. 77 (1913); Brown v. Kistleman,
supra.
Paradoxically, however, the courts do not find that the loss of
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consortium is too remote or consequential when a husband is seek-
ing recovery in identical circumstances. On the contrary, the ma-
jority of courts grant recovery to the husband in such a situation.
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Kinman, supra; Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v.
Glenn, supra; McKinney v. Western Stage Co., supra; See Notes, 21
A. L. R. 1517 (1922); 133 A. L. R. 1156 (1941).
A more formidable argument has been used by still other
courts in refusing recovery to the wife. They conclude that the
common law recognized no cause of action in the wife for loss of
consortium, and that the Women's Enabling Acts have given her
no new cause of action. Cravens v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 195 Ky.
257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922); Bernhardt v. Perry, supra; Emerson v.
Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 104 Atl. 538 (1918); Kosciolek v. Portland R.
Light and P. Co., 81 Or. 517, 160 Pac. 132 (1916). This line of rea-
soning however has not gone unchallenged. In fact it has met with
strong opposition by those who argue that even prior to the passage
of the Married Women's Acts, the courts recognized the existence of
an injury to the wife's personal rights resulting from a negligently
inflicted injury to her husband. The courts were forced to deny the
Wife a remedy, however, because under common law, a wife was
a legal nonentity and incapable of maintaining any action for the
violation of her personal rights as a wife. See the dissenting opinion
by Chief Justice Bond in Bernhardt v. Perry, supra.
It is interesting too, that a majority of courts, in alienation of
affection suits, brought by the wife, go to great lengths to prove that
the common law did recognize the right of a wife to the consortium
of her husband, but, that as stated above, she was incapable of
maintaining any action because of her disabilities. See Bennett v.
Bennett, supra. A middle ground was taken by an Ohio court in
Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621 (1878) who took the position
that the common law was in doubt as to whether the wife had the
right with no accompanying remedy, or no right at all.
The reason for such a denial is given as being attributable to
the inferior status of the wife at common law. 3 BL. Comm. 143. It
is submitted that inasmuch, as by universal agreement, it is of the
essence of every marriage contract that the parties thereto, shall in
regard to this particular matter of conjugal rights and affection,
stand upon an equality, it is difficult to find support for the con-
tinued denial in that obsolete reason.
Some courts, although refusing to grant recovery to the wife
for a negligently inflicted injury upon the husband, have neverthe-
less permitted her to recover for loss of consortium occasioned by
the sale of opium or liquor to the husband, after being notified not
to do so. Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P. 2d 147 (1940); Moberg
v. Scott, 38 S.D. 422, 161 N.W. 998 (1917); Flandermeyer v. Cooper,
85 Ohio St. 322, 98 N. E. 102 (1912).
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In spite of almost universal condemnation on the part of legal
writers, there is little indication of any change in the rule. It has
been stated that the loss of services is an outworn fiction. PRossER,
TORTS 948 (1941). The wife's interest in the undisturbed relation
with her consort is no less worthy of protection than that of her
husband. There is no valid reason for allowing the wife recovery
for a direct interference with the marital relation, by alienation of
affections, and denying it for more indirect harm through personal
injury to the husband, when no such distinction is made in the hus-
band's action. As the court in the principal case states: "When a
legally protected interest of a person has been injured by the
wrongful act of another, it is no less actionable because the invasion
was negligent rather than intentional or malicious." See Holbrook,
The Change in Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1923);
Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COL. L. REv. 651
(1930); Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 460, 466 (1934).
The court in the principal case is to be highly commended for
its courageous action in refusing to be bound by the shackles of
precedent in granting recovery to the wife.
Charles J. Kerester
Evm D.c - DYING DECLARATIONS - DEcLARAT's KNOWLEDGE OF
IMPENDiNG DEATH
In a trial for first degree murder, the court refused to admit
the testimony of five witnesses as to statements made by deceased
on his death bed accusing a third party. The reason advanced by
the trial court for the ruling was that the deceased did not expressly
declare he was dying, "in so many words," and therefore there was
no guarantee of trustworthiness for his statements. The deceased
had been shot through the lung, near the heart. Also, some of the
large blood vessels had been severed by the bullet. When told to
wait until the doctor came before turning over, deceased said, "I
can't make it." On appeal, held, reversed. The declarant was under
a "sense" of immediate and impending death and the fact that he
made no express statement so declaring does not make the state-
ment inadniissable. Fulton v. State, 47 So. 2d 883 (Miss. 1950).
Dying declarations have constituted an exception to the hearsay
rule since 1700. The exception is one of necessity since the witness
has died and cannot be called upon to relate the facts at the trial.
5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1431 (3d ed. 1940); ELLIOT, EVIDENCE 345
(1940). At early common law, dying declarations were admissable
in both civil and criminal cases. Wright v. Littler, 3 Burr. 1244
(1761); Stobart v. Dryden, 1 M & W 615 (1808). The modern doc-
trine restricts the use of dying declarations to homicide or abortion
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cases, "... in which the death of the victim is an element of the
offense." Crookham v. State, 5 W. Va. 510 (1871). See Note, 91
A. L. R. 561 (1934). Legislatures and courts have, in some juris-
dictions, done away with this restriction. Missouri Pacific R. Co. V.
Hampton, 195 Ark. 335, 112 S. W. 2d 428 (1938); Thurston v. Fritz,
91 Kan. 468, 138 Pac. 625 (1914); COLO. ST. 1937, June 4, c. 145.
The question involved in the principal case has troubled many
courts in the past. Is it mandatory, in order for the declaration to
be admissable, that the declarant express, "in so many words", his
knowledge of his immediate and impending death? The Mississippi
court, in answering the question in the negative has followed the
majority view in America today. Davis v. People, 77 Colo. 546, 238
Pac. 25 (1925); People v. La Panne, 225 Mich. 38, 237 N. W. 38
(1931); State v. Stephan, 118 N. J. L. 592, 194 Atl. 273 (1937);
Commonwealth v. Puntario, 271 Pa. 501, 115 AUt. 831 (1922);
Pollack v. State, 215 Wis. 200, 253 N. W. 561 (1934); 5 WiGmoRE,
EVIDENCE § 1442 (3d ed. 1940).
According to this decision, the declarant's statements must be
controlled by his "sense" of immediate and impending death. The
declarant must have given up all hope of recovery. Wilkinson v.
State, 134 Miss. 324, 108 So. 711 (1926). The deceased does not have
to express his knowledge of impending death in so many words.
This "sense" may be inferred from surrounding circumstances, the
nature of the wound, or the fact that the doctor told the deceased
that he was going to die. State v. Logan, 34 Mo. 351, 126 S. W. 2d
256 (1939); People v. Bartelini, 258 N. Y. 433, 35 N. E. 2d 29 (1941);
26 Am. Jur. Homicide, § 421 (1940).
The jurisdictions which held in opposition to this view put
emphasis on the dangerous nature of hearsay evidence. There
could be no guarantee of trustworthiness because there could be no
cross-examination, State v. Brunetto, 13 La. An. 45 (1858), and
there was no sanction of an oath, Tracy v. People, 97 IMI. 106 (1880).
But these courts recognized an exception where the declarant was
dying and knew he was dying. State v. Peake, 10 N. J. Law J. 177
(1887); People v. Del Vermo, 192 N.Y. 470, 85 N. E. 690 (1911);
State v. Gallagher, 4 Wash. 2d 437, 103 P. 2d 1100. However, some
courts were reluctant to extend this exception to admit the dying
declarations unless accompanied by express words, by the declar-
ant, as to his knowledge of his immediate and impending death.
State v. Knoll, 69 Kan. 767, 77 Pac. 580 (1904); Austin v. Com., 19
Ky. L. Rep. 474, 40 S.W. 905 (1897); Smith v. State, 9 Humph. 22
(Tenn. 1848). It is submitted however, that admission of hearsay
evidence should be put to a test not so strong as to exclude all evi-
dence of dying declarations when their admission is of "necessity."
If the trial court is convinced by the evidence given, that the declar-
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ant was making a probative statement, then it seems useless to
require the declarant to tell us so. "The tendency is towards the
reception rather than the rejection of evidence, experience having
shown that more harm results from its exclusion than from its ad-
mission." Thurston v. Fritz, supra at p. 475.
The significance of the principal case does not lie in the fact
that the declarant no longer is required to make a formal statement,
but rather lies in the fact that Mississippi, along with almost all
other jurisdictions, has seen the need for abandoning one of the
time-honored arbitrary rules of dying declarations.
Melvin J. Woodford
LABOR LAW - SECONDARY BOYCOTT - PEACEFUL PICKETING OF A
BUILDING SITE
The local business agent of the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (AFL), learning that the electrical subcon-
tractor, Langer, on a home construction contract, was employing
non-union men, visited the site of the job and told Deltorto, the
subcontractor handling the carpentry, that non-union electricians
were working on the job. The next day the agent returned and
picketed the site with a sign reading, "This job is unfair to organized
labor." Seeing this sign, the two union carpenters who were the
only men at work left the job. The union agent ceased picketing
and called the general contractor, Giorgi, and told him that he
would have to replace Langer with a union contractor or he
could not complete the job. Langer filed a charge with the N.L.R.B.
under Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (b) (4) (A) (1950). A complaint was
issued and the trial examiner found that Section 8 (c) of the Act
excused the picketing as an expression of "free speech". The
N.L.R.B. reversed the trial examiner and held the picketing to be a
violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act, concluded that this
section was not modified by Section 8 (c), and accordingly issued
a cease and desist order against the union. On Appeal, Judge Clark
dissenting, held, affirmed. By inducing the union carpenters to quit
work in order to force Giorgi, the general contractor, "to cease do-
ing business with" Langer, the electrical subcontractor, the union
was engaged in a secondary boycott in violation of Section 8 (b)
(4) (A). LB.E.W., Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 Fed. 2d 34 (2nd Cir.
1950).
Prior to the Labor Management Relations Act, equity courts
held unlawful economic pressure which was applied indirectly in
labor disputes so as to coerce third parties to become involved.
Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1930).
[VCol. 12
RECENT DECISIONS
Some courts considered the lack of a common economic interest as
essential for holding such pressure actionable; others viewed such
pressure as prima facie actionable and only justifiable if such a
common interest could be found. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range.
Co. 221 U.S. 418 (1910); Goldfinger v. Feintuck, 276 N.Y. 281, 11
N.E. 2d 910 (1937). See Note, 116 A.L.R. 508 (1938). However,
harm caused by "inducing third persons through fair persuasion
and for a proper object to refrain, during their dispute with the
employer, from.., being engaged in a job on which he also is en-
gaged.. ." was considered legitimate labor activity. RFSTATEMENT,
TORTS § 799 (rev. ed. 1939). In either case the effect was to enjoin
the pressure only where the common interest was absent. Bossert
v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 77 Misc. 592, 37
N.Y. Supp. 321 (Sup. Ct. 1912). Such economic pressure, when
applied to parties other than those directly engaged in the dispute,
was called a secondary boycott.
The majority in the principal case finds the primary dispute
to be between the union and Langer and labels the pressure a sec-
ondary boycott by finding that the picketing was directed primarily
against Deltorto for the purpose of putting pressure on Giorgi to
replace Langer with a union contractor. Under the Act they found
it unnecessary to test for a lack of ecenomic interest. If that test
had been applied, the court would have examined the interest that
union carpenters might have with the unionizing of electricians on
the same job. See Note, 6 A.L.R. 962 (1920). At first blush this
interest seems too remote to justify the pressure on the carpenters.
However, many courts, on more careful analysis, have reached a
different result. Meser v. Speer, 96 Ark. 618, 132 S.W. 988 (1910);
Seymour Ruff & Sons v. Bricklayers' Union, 163 Md. 688, 164 A.
752 (1935); Gray v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 97 N.W.
663 (1903). Thus in Meser v. Speer, supra, it was held that refusal
of union laborers to lay stone for one subcontractor where another
subcontractor on the same job hired non-union men was not an un-
lawful conspiracy. See Note, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 792. It is, therefore,
a permitted objective for labor unions to require all the laborers
on a job to be union men. See 31 Am. JuR., LABOR §§ 264 to 269
(1940). The majority in the principal case cancluded that it was not
important that the carpenters were at work on the site of the dis-
pute. But in Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 316 U.S.
722 (1941), the court speaks of confining the pressure to the area
of the job where the grievance exists. In American Federation of
Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1940), Justice Frankfurter said, "The
State cannot exclude from peaceful picketing the right of free com-
munication by drawing the circle of economic competition so small
as to... (deny) ... the interdependence of the economic interest
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of all engaged in the same industry. .. ." Thus it would seem im-
portant that the third party was engaged at the site of the grievance
and that the carpenters and electricians were engaged in the same
industry, the building industry, for if the building trades were or-
ganized by an industrial union rather than by a trade union, there
would be but one union and the carpenters would have a direct in-
terest in having the electricians in the union. TELLER, LABOR Dis-
PUTES Am COLLECTIVE BARGAiNmG, 301 (1940). It is difficult to see
why this interest should be any less where the unions involved are
two crafts of a trade union in the same industry. Therefore, it seems
to follow that grave doubts might be raised as to the "neutrality"
of Deltorto and his unionized carpenters with respect to the dispute
between Langer and the I.B.E.W.
The dissent finds the dispute to be between the I.B.E.W. and
Giorgi and holds that the union, in picketing the site of the job, was
applying a direct pressure on Giorgi and that the unionized carpen-
ters became involved only indirectly as their work was "enmeshed"
with that of the parties to the dispute. By this analysis the pressure
is primary and not secondary and hence would not have been sub-
ject to an injunction in equity.
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
supra, makes it an unfair labor practice "for a labor organization
or its agent.., to induce or encourage the employees of any employ-
er to engage in ... a concerted refusal . . . to work ... where an
object thereof is forcing.. . any employer to cease doing business
with any other person." In interpreting this section, the majority
in the principal case concludes that "Congress, in the search for a
compromise between the conflicting interest of employees in collec-
tive bargaining and that of neutrals in avoiding involvements in
quarrels not their own, decided to draw a line at secondary boy-
cotts." 181 Fed. 2d 34, 40 (2nd Cir. 1950). Also see comment of
Senator Taft, 93 CONG. REC. 4323 (1947), "This provision [Section 8
(b) (4) (A) ] makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to
injure the business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned
in the disagreement between the employer and his employees." This
seems to be the view of all the courts that have interpreted this
Section. NEW Yomu< UN-vEssrrY THmD AxuAL CoNFERENCE ON
LABOR, 372 (1950). But it should be noted that in the statute there
is no mention of the term, secondary boycott, nor does Section 8 (b)
(4) (A) include the requirements that were applied as tests for a
secondary pressure by equity courts prior to the Act. The Act
speaks of inducing the employees of any employer and not of co-
ercing third parties with no interest common to the dispute. In
Metal Polishers Union v. Climax Machine Company, 86 N.L.R.B. 142
(Nov. 4, 1949), it is said, "The breadth of the language of that sec-
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tion [8 (b) (4) (A) ] ... if literally interpreted, and given full
scope, could reach out to ban practically all strike and picketing
activities no matter against whom directed."
In the principal case the majority would admit but one excep-
tion to the broad language of this Act. They found that the I.B.E.W.,
by picketing, "induced" the carpenters to refuse to work in order to
force Giorgi to "cease doing business" with Langer. This one ex-
ception is where the business of the third party is so "enmeshed"
with that of the offending employer that pressure applied directly
to such employer falls only indirectly on the third party because of
his proximity to the dispute. In this case, since the carpenters
were the only tradesmen working at the time of the picketing, the
majority concludes that this was not a case of "enmeshing" but
one of direct pressure on a third party. The dissent would further
relax the broad language of the Act by enlarging its definition of
the dispute to include the general contractor as the offending em-
ployer. This makes the picketing a primary or direct pressure when
it is restricted to the site of the dispute. The dissent also would
hold that the phrase "cease doing business" should not include
parties "allied" to the same job by contract. Mills v. United Associa-
tion of Journeymen, 83 F. Supp. 240 (W.D. Mo. 1949).
A labor organization is justified in engaging in peaceful picket-
ing where the object is to persuade the employer to hire union
employees. Lauf v. E. G. Shinver & Company, 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
The nature of the construction trade makes it difficult to define who
the employer is. The majority in the principal case would restrict
the union to pressure against the subcontractor while the dissent
would go further and hold that the general contractor is so "allied"
to the subcontractor that he is not a neutral to this dispute. In the
more recent case of Denver Building & Construction Trade Council
v. NLRB, 26 L.R.R.M. 515 (1950), the court cited Section 13 of the
Act which says, "Nothing in this act, except as specifically provided
for herein, shall be construed as to ... diminish in any way the right
to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right,"
and held that clearer language than that of Section 8 (b) (4) (A)
would be needed to take the conduct of the union in a situation
similar to that of the principal case out of the protection of Sec-
tion 13.
The failure of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) to state that its purpose
is to outlaw secondary boycotts, see comment of Senator Taft, supra,
and the exceedingly broad language used to define the prohibited
practices, have been the basis of many difficulties in applying this
section. No court has yet attempted to apply the words of the Act
to their fullest import. The decision in the principal case would
restrict these words only where the third party's activities are so
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"enmeshed" with those of the offending employer that he is involved
through his activities at the site of the dispute. Such a result seems
to be within the broad language of Section 8 (b) (4) (A), but it
would include pressures which prior to the Act would have been
found to be primary. Such a result is very dubious when viewed
in the light of Section 13 and Section 8 (c). The purpose of Section
8 (b) (4) (A) is to prohibt union pressure upon "neutrals". In an
early decision, the National Labor Relations Board held that the
important question in such cases is whether the union's activities
are aimed primarily at the offending employer or at the neutral.
The pressure is primary and lawful where the neutral is involved
in the dispute only because he uses the premises of the offending
employer. NLRB v. Pure Oil Company, 84 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (June
17, 1949). But a different view is now taken at a construction site.
A view contrary to the principal case has been taken in Denver
Building & Trade Council v. NLRB, supra, by the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, on the theory that the union
was picketing to unionize the job, not to force the general contractor
to "cease doing business with the subcontractor". By this analysis
the pressure is not secondary or a violation of Section 8 (b) (4)
(A). The resolution of these divergent views is bound to have wide
practical effect both in the construction industry proper and among
industrial firms which have construction work done in connection
with their premises.
Frank H. Poland, Jr.
Mu' icIPAL CoRPoRATioxs - ImmInnTY FROM TORT LiABILITY -
INsURANcE AGAINST
The city of Raleigh, N. C., purchased public liability insurance
against claims for injuries and damages it might become obligated
to pay. Attached to the policy was an endorsement in which the
insurer agreed not to claim exemption in actions that the insured,
by reason of its being a municipal corporation, would be legally
exempt from liability. Plaintiff's intestate was killed in a collision
with a city owned truck which admittedly was being employed in
a governmental function. In an action for wrongful death, the
insurance attorneys, defending the city, demurred to the complaint
but were overruled by the trial court. Held, reversed. A munici-
pality is not liable for the otherwise tortious acts of its agents
arising in the performance of a governmental function, nor can a
municipality waive such immunity by procuring insurance because
it has no statutory or implied authority to do so; further, insurance
is a contract to indemnify the named insured and does not create
liability to any other who might suffer from alleged tortious acts
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of municipal servants. Stephenson v. City of Raleigh, 232 N.C. 42,
59 S.E. 2d 195 (1950).
The North Carolina court adhered rigidly to the vulnerable
but tenacious dogma of municipal immunity from tort liability
arising in the performance of a "governmental" as distinguished
from a "proprietary" function. Splinter v. City of Nampa, 215 P. 2d
999 (Idaho 1950); Martinson v. City of Alpena, 44 N.W. 2d 148,
(Mich. 1950); Aldrich v. City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342,
140 N.E. 164 (1922). Leading authorities have assailed this "doc-
trine of heresy" for well over a quarter century. Borchard, Gov-
ernmental Immunity in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924); Symposium
on Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAw AN CONTEMfPORARY PROBLEMS
179 (1942); Concerning Ohio law, see Hunter and Boyer, Tort
Liability of Local Governments in Ohio, 9 Omo ST. L.J. 377 (1948)
and, Note, 9 Omo ST. L.J. 174 (1948).
Can a city, without statutory authority, employ insurance to
protect its citizens and visitors from its otherwise negligent acts
during the execution of governmental duties? In the principal
case, the court denied the legality of waiver of immunity as a
means to effectuate this desirable end. Even before the problem
of waiver is reached there are two hurdles to be overcome, the
first being the constitutional prohibition against spending public
monies for private purposes. Opinion of the Justices, 313 Mass.
779, 47 N.E. 2d 260 (1943); Auditor of Lucas County v. State ex
rel. Boyles, 75 Ohio St. 114, 78 N.E. 955 (1904). The expenditure
of money for insurance against liability arising from proprietary
functions, or imposed by law, is universally upheld, but purchase
of liability insurance relating to governmental functions is ques-
tioned. H. B. Wilson, Municipal Insurance Costs and Practices
(1939), REPORT No. 132 or Ammi cmx MuNiciRAL AssociATioN 44.
One case absolutely ruled it out. Pohland v. City of Sheboygan,
251 Wis. 20, 27 N.W. 2d 736 (1947). Arguably, the lawfulness of
the expenditure could be rested on a moral obligation to the
claimant, but this has received scant judicial support. Lambert v.
New Haven, 129 Conn. 647, 30 A. 2d 923 (1943); Tomkins v. Wil-
liams, 62 S.W. 2d 70 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). Contra: Evans v. Berry,
262 N.Y. 61, 186 N.E. 203 (1933). It is not without significance
that an Ohio decision recognized the moral obligation theory in
upholding a special statute authorizing a county to pay a tort
claim. Spitzig v. State, 119 Ohio St. 117, 162 N.E. 394 (1928).
And some Ohio municipalities have been paying tort claims on a
moral obligation theory.
The second hurdle in the way of a city's protecting its citizens
and visitors with insurance is one imposed by insurance law. An
insurance contract is one to indemnify; the insured must be in a
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position to suffer a loss or he lacks an insurable interest. Bartling
v. German... Insurance Company, 154 Ia. 335, 134 N.W. 864
(1912); Liverpool & Globe & London Ins. Co. v. Bolling, 176 Va.
182, 10 S.E. 2d 518 (1943). As to liability insurance in relation to
governmental functions it is very difficult to find an insurable in-
terest unless a moral obligation to pay tort claims is recognized.
Louisiana, aided by a statute since repealed, DART'S LA. GEN.
STAT. 1932, § 4248, repealed by, ACTS 1948, No. 195, § 32.01, had a
novel approach to this situation. The immunity was considered
personal and the insurer was not in a position to plead it. There,
however, the insurer could be sued directly by the claimant. Rome
v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 169 So. 132 (La. App. 1936);
Fordham and Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in Tort in
Louisiana, 3 LA. L. REV. 748 (1941). However desirable this result
may be, the rationale seems doubtful considering the requirement
of an insurable interest and the fact that the immunity is from
liability and not merely from suit. Lambert v. City of New Haven,
supra; Sloper v. Quincy, 301 Mass. 20, 16 N.E. 2d 14 (1938).
The upshot of the principal case is that under existing legal
thought a community cannot generally, short of legislation, pro-
tect its citizens and visitors from its otherwise negligent acts during
governmental duties. However, it would seem if the moral obliga-
tion theory to pay tort claims was recognized, liability insurance
relating to governmental functions could be treated the same as
that relating to proprietary functions. Considering the multitudi-
nous contacts ever-expanding government has with the individual,
the facility with which insurance can be obtained, and the fact
that premium reductions can be acquired once the actuarial ex-
perience rating of each risk is determined, the most desirable result
would be complete abolition of immunity. New York has done this.
N.Y. LAws 1939, c. 860, § 8. However, a seed must be planted be-
fore an oak grows, and a practical approach would be to make
statutory inroads in governmental immunity as often and as quick-
ly as possible.
John B Dwyer
NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS- SAVING OF EXPENSE AS A PROFIT
Relators sought to incorporate a proposed corporation not
for profit. The purpose of the corporation was to secure the bene-
fits of home ownership to the inhabitants of a certain community.
This was to be accomplished by the purchase of certain property,
and the conveying, leasing, developing or operating of such prop-
erty in a manner that would best serve the interests of the inhabit-
ants and the community. The Secretary of State declined to record
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the articles of incorporation because a previous decision had held
that a real estate business could not be incorporated as a corpora-
tion not for profit. Mandamus was brought to require the respond-
ents to record the article of incorporation. Held, writ denied.
The proposed corporation failed to meet the statutory require-
ments for a corporation not for profit. The benefits conferred upon
the members of the corporation include pecuniary gain or profit.
The saving of an expense which would otherwise necessarily be
incurred is a profit to the person benefited. State ex rel. Russell
et al. v. Sweeney, Secretary of State, 153 Ohio St. 66, 91 N. E. 2d
13 (1950).
The first case involving non-profit corporations to state that
a saving of an expense is a profit is State ex rel Troy, Pros. Atty.
v. Lumbermen's Clinic, 186 Wash. 384, 58 P. 2d 812 (1936). In
the Troy case the employers were obligated to pay for medical aid
given their workmen. The state would furnish this service for a
certain charge. A group of employers organized a corporation for
the purpose of furnishing this medical aid at a cost lower than
that charged by the state. The Washington court held that this
saving of an expense resulted in a profit to the members of the
corporation.
Only two other cases concerning non-profit corporations dis-
cuss the problem of whether the saving of an expense is a profit.
A recent New Hampshire case, Petition of White Mountain Power
Co. et al., 71 A. 2d 503 (N. H. 1950) cited the Washington case,
and limited its comment to these words, "And in a sense, a saving
of expense is a profit." The other case is the principal one, which
cites and follows the theory of the Washington decision.
The "saving of an expense is a profit" theory, however, is not
foreign to the administration of Ohio corporation law. "Articles
of incorporation intended to be filed under authority of General
Corporation Act . . . one of whose principal objects is to secure
more favorable terms or savings for its members in the purchasing
of property or services should be filed as a corporation for profit."
Op. A=y. GEN. 644 (1942).
All corporations organized for the purpose of saving an ex-
pense, nevertheless, will not be classified as corporations for profit.
Oro Gzx. CODE § 10185 provides for the incorporation of co-oper-
ative trade associations "for the purpose of purchasing, in quantity,
grain, goods, groceries, fruits, vegetables, provisions, or any other
articles of merchandise, and distributing them to consumers at
the actual cost and expense of purchasing, holding, and distribu-
tion." An excerpt from Oro GEr. CODE § 5495, "each corporation
not for profit organized pursuant to sections 10185 and 10186,"
indicates that a co-operative trade association will be classified as
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a corporation not for profit. Special provision for another excep-
tion is made by OHo GEN. CODE § 10186-31 which provides for the
formation of a non-profit corporation to provide housing for vet-
erans by the purchasing of real property and constructing resi-
dences thereon for sale to members of the corporation without
any profit to the corporation.
The articles of incorporation of the proposed corporation in
the principal case were attempted to be filed under the General
Corporation Act, OHio GEN. CODE § 8623-97, which provides as fol-
lows: "A corporation not for profit may be formed hereunder for
any purpose or purposes not involving pecuniary gain or profit."
How this statute has been interpreted is illustrated by a case
involving a non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of
promoting interest in and appreciation of scientific angling. To
better conduct a national tournament, the corporation contracted
for the manufacture of uniform equipment which it sold in excess
of costs to its members. In a quo warranto proceeding seeking an
order of ouster on the ground that the making of a profit on the
sale of the equipment was in violation of its franchise rights, the
court stated that "we do not find that the defendant's merchandis-
ing activities are in any sense a profit making purpose, and any
excess in resale over cost was purely incidental and properly used
for the expenses and maintenance of the organization." State ex
rel. Bartlett, Pros. Atty., v. National Ass'n. of Angling & Casting
Clubs, 51 N. E. 2d 622 (Ohio 1943). In another recent case where
the question was whether a club's enterprises constituted "busi-
ness" within the meaning of OHo GEN. CODE § 5325-1, the court
stated that a corporation not for profit may conduct its enterprises
for gain, profit or net income to the corporation as a legal entity.
The American Jersey Cattle Club v. Glander, Tax Comm'r., 152
Ohio St. 506, 90 N. E. 2d 433 (1950).
When considering whether a corporation is one for or not
for profit, the Angling Club case indicates that the principal ob-
jects of a corporation are the determining factors and that an
incidental profit will not destroy the non-profit character of a
corporation. Likewise, neither should the effect of an incidental
saving of an expense to the members of a corporation whose prin-
cipal objects qualify it as a corporation not for profit cause such
corporation to lose its non-profit character. A corporation formed
for the purposes of association, amusement, literary and social
culture and mutual improvement, which had a club-house where
members could procure refreshments at reduced prices has been
held not a corporation for profit. Cheney v. Ketcham, 5 N. P. 139,
7 0. D. 183 (Ohio C. P. 1898).
It cannot be disputed that a saving of an expense is of pecuni-
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ary value; therefore, a saving of an expense can be considered
pecuniary gain or profit. And since the principal object of the
corporation in the case at bar was the saving of an expense by
making home ownership available at cost of development, the
court was consistent with previous decisions by holding that the
proposed corporation was not a corporation not for profit.
Michael Bulischak
SALES - IPIED WARRANTES EXTENSION TO SEcoND HAND GOODS
Plaintiff brought an action to recover part of the purchase
price for a factory sold to the defendant, who resisted payment
claiming plaintiff breached the warranty for fitness by represent-
ing a used boiler, included in the sale, as one in good condition
and amply fit for defendant's purposes. The boiler had to be re-
placed. Held, motion for summary judgment denied. Even though
express warranty is defeated by the parol evidence rule there is
a debatable issue whether defendant relied on plaintiff's judgment
within the language of the Uniform Sales Act, Section 15 (1).
Standard Brands Inc. v. Consolidated Badger Coop., 89 F. Supp.
5 (E.D. Wis. 1950).
The common law majority view was that no implied warranty
of fitness arose from the sale of second hand goods. Johnson v.
Carden, 187 Ala. 142, 65 So. 813 (1914); 151 A.L.R. 447 (1944);
46 Am. Jur. § 360 (1943); 1 WILISTON, SALES 232 (rev. ed. 1948).
There was a minority view at common law to the effect that there
are implied warranties for second hand goods where the defect is
not obvious, and the buyer is misled and relies on the seller's skill
or judgment. Walker v. Ayer, 80 S.C. 292, 61 S.E. 557 (1908).
See Note, 151 A.L.R. 554 (1944) and cases cited; 1 WILLISTON,
SALES §§ 233a, 235, 237 (rev. ed. 1948).
Section 15 (1) of the Uniform Sales Act provides, " . . . there
is no implied warranty as to fitness for any particular purpose...
except . . . (1) where buyer . . . makes known . . . to seller ...
purpose for which goods are required and.., buyer relies on...
seller's . . . judgment." Section 76 of the Uniform Sales Act pro-
vides, "Goods include all chattels personal other than things in
action and money." The courts have held that the Act does not
exclude second hand goods from its coverage. Moss v. Yount, 296
Ky. 415, 177 S.W. 2d 372 (1944); Drumar Mining Co. v. Morris
Ravine Mining Co., 33 Cal. App. 2d 492, 92 P. 2d 424 (1939). See
Note, 29 A.L.R. 1227 (1924).
The Uniform Sales Act was adopted in Ohio on May 9, 1908.
It was almost forty years later, however, before an Ohio court
construed section 15 (1) pertinent to its coverage of second hand
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goods, holding in Regula v. Gerber, 70 N.E. 2d 662 (C.P. 1946)
that the Act, Oiuo GEN. CODE §§ 8381-8456, applied to the sale
of second hand automobiles. Cf. Meyer v. Packard Cleveland
Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922).
The principal case seems to substantiate the present trend
toward holding that the Act does change the common law as to
implied warranties for fitness of second hand items.
Roy E. Gabbert
SALES - WARRANTY AcTiox - NECESSITY OF PRIVITY
The plaintiff purchased a can of anti-freeze from a service
station operator. The label on the can bore a warranty which
stated that the anti-freeze contained no harmful substance and
was safe for use in automobiles. Upon use, however, the anti-
freeze damaged the motor of the plaintiff's automobile, and the
plaintiff brought an action for breach of warranty against the
manufacturer. The Municipal Court of Cincinnati found for the
plaintiff, and the corporation appealed on questions of law to the
court of appeals. Held, no action may be maintained against a
manufacturer by a sub-purchaser, for injury to his chattel, based
upon an express warranty when there is no privity between the
parties. Jourdon v. Brouwer, 86 Ohio App. 505, 93 N.E. 2d 49
(1949).
By the common law doctrine of caveat emptor an ultimate
consumer had no cause of action against a manufacturer for defects
in the product. Winterbottom v. Wright, 30 M. & W. 109 (1842).
In McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916), the court granted a cause of action for negligent produc-
tion, and the majority of courts have adopted this view. Slavin v.
Francis H. Leggett & Co., 114 N.J.L. 421, 177 Atl. 120 (1935);
Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 273 N.Y. 485, 6 N.E. 2d 415
(1936); Sicard v. Kremer, 133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N.E. 2d 250 (1938);
RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 497 (1943). If, however, as in the principal
case, the consumer elects to sue on the breach of warranty, the
great majority of courts have held that there is no cause of action
when the parties are not in privity. Pearle v. Filenes' Sons Co.,
317 Mass. 529, 58 N.E. 2d 825 (1945); Poplar v. Hoschild, Kohn
Co., 180 Md. 389, 24 A. 2d 783 (1942); Turner v. Edison Storage
Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E. 423 (1928); 1 WILLSTON, SALES
§ 245 (3d ed. 1948).
There have been exceptions to this rule; these exceptions
seek to protect the consumer from extremes in advertising and
to compensate for judical leniency towards "puffing". In cases of
fraudulent representations, Knelling v. Roderick Lean Manufac-
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turing Co., 183 N.Y. 78, 75 N.E. 1098 (1905), and in the production
of inherently dangerous articles, Elizabeth Arden Inc. v. Brown,
107 F. 2d 938 (3d Cir. 1939); David v. McKesson and Robbins, 278
N.Y. 622, N.E. 2d 127 (1938), the American courts are almost un-
animous in dispensing with the requirement of privity.
Another exception which seems to be followed by a majority
of the courts exists in the case of foods and beverages. Taking
note of the nature of the product, its mode of sale, and the probable
harm resulting from latent defects, most courts have imposed ab-
solute liability on such manufacturers. Coca Cola Bottling Co. v.
Munn, 99 F. 2d 190 (4th Cir. 1938); Bergantino v. General Baking
Co., 298 Mass. 106, 9 N.E. 2d 521 (1938); Dunn v. Hoffman Bever-
age Co., 126 N.J.L. 556, 20 A. 2d 352 (1942); Ward Baking Co.
v. Trezzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928); Catini v. Swift,
251 Pa. 52, 95 Atl. 931 (1915).
These exceptions have not weakened the general rule to any
great extent, but recently there has been a trend of judicial thought
which threatens the whole basic requirement of privity. In 1 WIL-
LISTON, SALES § 245 (3d ed. 1948), the author remarks that there
seems to be no reason why warranties should be an exception to
the rule of contractual assignability, and Justice Cardoza, in Ultra-
mares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931), stated
that, "The assault upon the citadel of privity continues these days
apace." Other leading jurists and writers have criticized the use
of privity as the deciding factor in cases of breach of warranty.
Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HtAv. L. REv.
415 (1911); Notes, 33 COL. L. REv. 868 (1933); 37 COL. L. REv. 77
(1937); 15 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 292 (1937); 29 MIcH. L. REv. 906
(1931). Although privity is still required by the majority of
courts, there have been a number of cases which strike at the
very heart of the rule. In Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290
Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939), the court said, "It would be unjust
to recognize a rule that would permit manufacturers of products
to create a demand for their goods ... and then, because there is
no privity of contract, deny the consumer the right to recover if
damages result from the absence of those qualities, when such
absence is not readily noticeable." The most recent case to dis-
pense with the requirement of privity in an action on warranty
was Hunter-Wilson Distributing Co. v. Forest Distilling Co., 181
F. 2d 543 (S.D. Pa. 1950). In this case, the court merely said,
"Strict contractual privity is no longer necessary." There is no
doubt that there is valid authority for dispensing with the require-
ment of privity in actions on warranty. Timberland Lumber Co.
v. Climax Mfg. Co., 61 F. 2d 391 (3d Cir. 1932); Miller Rubber Co.
v. Blewster Stephens Service Station, 171 Ark. 1179, 287 S.W. 577
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(1926); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 15 P. 2d 1118
(1932). Assuredly, the requirement of privity is little suited to
the present economy. Some courts have emphasized the fallacy
of the general rule by treating the original vendee as a mere "con-
duit" between manufacturer and consumer. Scruggins v. Jones,
207 Ky. 636, 269 S.W. 743 (1924); McMurray v. Vaughn's Feed
Store, 117 Ohio St. 236, 157 N.E. 567 (1927). Other courts have
placed more emphasis upon the consumer's reliance on advertising.
Graham v. John R. Watts, 238 Ky. 96, 36 S.W. 2d 859 (1931).
There has been little adjudication of this question in Ohio.
In an early case the Supreme Court of Ohio denied a cause of
action when the parties were not in privity. Columbus, H.V. & T.
Railway Co. v. Gaffney, 65 Ohio St. 104, 61 N.E. 152 (1901). An
attempt to modify the rule was made in Ward Baking Co. v. Trez-
zino, supra, in which case an exception was made for foods and
beverages. However, dicta in Canton Provision Co. v. Gauder, 130
Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935), seems to indicate that, without
privity, there can be no cause of action for breach of warranty even
in the case of foods.
Whether the decision reached in Jourdon v. Brouwer, supra,
is the final determination of Ohio law is a moot question. Judge
Ross, in writing the majority opinion, treats the question as settled.
However, Judge Matthews, dissenting, adopts the reasoning ex-
pressed in the Ward Baking Co. case, supra, and states, "When a
vender places such representation and warranty on a label intend-
ed to be passed on until it reaches the ultimate consumer, . . . he
must be taken to have made the representation and warranty to
the ultimate consumer ..... Placing such a warranty on the article
sold brings the producer into jural relations with the ultimate con-
sumer, because the producer so intends. It is a representation and
a warranty made by the producer to ultimate consumer and creates
a privity between them."
It would seem that the Supreme Court of Ohio may choose
either of the solutions, for the weight of precedent is not heavy.
Which solution the court will select can only be determined by
subsequent adjudication, but the view dispensing with the require-
ment of privity seems more in accord with the needs of the present
day society.
Charles D. Minor
TORTS - SLANDER PER S - CALLING A MAN A COMUNIST
Defendant on a radio and television broadcast called plaintiff,
a government economist, a communist. In an action of slander, de-
fendant claimed the statements were not actionable without an
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allegation of special damages and made a motion to dismiss the
complaint under Rule 12 (b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Held, motion dismissed. Remarks were injurious to
the plaintiff in his profession and were therefore slanderous per
se. Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
Since early in the seventeenth century the distinction between
libel and slander has been one between written and oral words.
Oral words constitute slander, State v. Smily, 37 Ohio St. 30 (1881);
PRossER, ToRTs 793 (1941); and written words libel. Lyman v. New
England Newspaper Pub. Co., 286 Mass. 258, 190 N.E. 542, 90
A.L.R. 1124 (1934); PaossER, supra. The present tendency is to
make the distinction on the basis of permanence of form. It has
been held that words read from a script on a radio broadcast con-
stitute libel, Soresen v. Wood, 123 Nebr. 348, 243 N.W. 82, 82 A.L.R.
1098 (1932), appeal dismissed, 290 U.S. 599 (1933); 33 AM. JUR.
39; P ossER, supra 795, 812; whereas extemporaneous statements
published via radio constitute slander. Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc.
877, 299 N.Y.S. 188 (1937). According to the prevailing view, all
libel is actionable without proof that damage has occurred. PRossm,
supra § 92. As a rule slander is not actionable without showing
special damages, however there are four types of oral defamatory
statements actionable per se: (a) the imputation of a serious crime,
(b) the imputation of certain loathsome diseases, (c) imputations
affecting the plaintiff in his business, trade, profession or office, and
(d) the imputation of unchastity to a woman. Pollard v. Lyon, 91
U.S. 225 (1875); 33 Am. JuR. 44; SEEiMAN, THE LAW OF LiBEL AiN
SLAsmER 599 et seq; RFsTATEmNT, TORTS 170.
Being a communist is not a crime. However, calling a person
a communist may impute other crimes, such as perjury, or other
statutory offences, which arise only because of the peculiar cir-
cumstances of a particular plaintiff. For example, before such
statement would impute the crime of perjury it must be shown
that this plaintiff had stated under oath that he was not a com-
munist, prior to the defendant's accusations. The result is defam-
ation by extrinsic facts, which is not slanderous per se. O'Connell
v. Press Publishing Co., 214 N.Y. 352, 108 N.E. 556 (1915); Hays v.
American Defense Soc. Inc., 252 N.Y. 266, 169 N.E. 380 (1929). For
this reason "imputations of a serious crime" cannot be the basis for
holding such statements slanderous per se.
It is well settled that false words which tend to prejudice the
plaintiff in his business or profession are actionable per se. Pollard
v-. Lyon, supra; RESTATEMENT, supra, §§ 573, 770. The defamer
need not refer to the plaintiff as engaged in the particular profes-
sion in question. It is sufficient if the statement is of a character
to be particularly disparaging of one engaged in such an occupation.
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Sanderson v. Chaldwell, 45 N.Y. 398, 6 Am. Rep. 105 (1871). The
court, in Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E. 2d 259 (1947),
has taken judicial notice of the present day attitude toward com-
munists in the United States, "Today and in the recent past... it
it undeniable that for communism and its adherents and sympa-
thizers, there has been widespread public aversion."
Calling the plaintiff, in the principal case, a communist un-
doubtedly caused him greater injury than it would others in pro-
fessions or trades where basic beliefs are less emphasized. It end-
ed his usefulness as a public servant, for such accusations even
though false, created distrust toward him. Undeniably the demand
for his views and theories as an economist will be lessened by
such accusations, for it is but natural to presume that an economist
who is a communist adheres to the economic theories of commun-
ism, which are repugnant to the theories accepted in this country.
The stress, by the court, of the degree of the injury to this plaintiff
in his profession appears to be the prime factor in declaring this
slander per se. From such emphasis on the magnitude of the injury
by the court it would seem that a laborer might have more difficulty
in stating a cause of action without alleging special damage be-
cause the damage to him in his trade would be of a lesser degree.
Hugh D. Wait
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